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"Everything about ownership is changing." 
—Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone, 111. 
On March 16, 2001, the Stephens Mitchell trust, the copyright owners of 
Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind, sought an injunction against Houghton 
Mifflin from publishing and distributing Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone 
and an order to immediately destroy all materials relating to it.1 The copyright 
owners claimed that The Wind Done Gone constituted an unauthorized derivative 
work that incorporated and infringed on the characters and plot lines of Mitchell's 
classic.2 In their defense, Houghton Mifflin asserted that "The Wind Done Gone 
is an original work of expression created by Alice Randall" and that "in the 
event that the Court or jury finds that The Wind Done Gone copies copyrightable 
expressions from Gone With The Wind, any such copying is a fair use."3 After a 
lengthy court battle, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to 
issue the injunction4 and the parties arrived at a settlement before the Court 
delivered its final decision in the case. 
This case created substantial controversy because it involved Gone With 
the Wind, a novel that some have considered "the best-selling popular historical 
novel ever published in America."5 Gone With the Wind tells the story of the 
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vivacious and impetuous Scarlett O'Hara, who reaches adulthood on the eve of 
the Civil War and struggles to find love and wealth in the South during and after 
this watershed event in United States history. Given its southern setting and 
Scarlett's position as the daughter of a white, rich plantation owner, the novel 
contains many African American characters who begin the novel as slaves and 
follow their former owners even after the war. Upon its release, the book and 
subsequent movie produced a wide range of responses—from adulation to 
disgust.6 Although 60 years have elapsed between the release of the book and 
the movie and the present day, Gone With the Wind (in both the movie and book 
form) still remains popular.7 
As a response to the continued appreciation and presence of Gone With the 
Wind, Alice Randall wrote The Wind Done Gone} Randall's novel takes the 
original and turns it on its head. Randall's revision focuses on the viewpoints of 
the slaves and servants on the plantation Tara. Unlike Gone With the Wind, 
which does not include any characters that suggest sexual liaisons between whites 
and blacks in the antebellum South, Randall creates a new narrative center for 
her retelling by developing a character—Cynara, the illegitimate daughter of 
Scarlett's father, Gerald O'Hara—(and therefore Scarlett's half-sister) who was 
not present in Mitchell's version. Cynara's life is a direct contrast to Scarlett's 
and demonstrates the differences between black experiences and memories of 
that period from those described by Mitchell. In her parody, Randall changes 
character and place names: Scarlett is now named Other; Ashley Wilkes, the 
white gentleman after whom Scarlett pines, is Dreamy Gentleman, and he is 
gay; Melanie Wilkes, Ashley's husband, is Mealy Mouth. Other changes include 
transforming the main plantation's name from Tara to Tata and another plantation 
from "Twelve Oaks" to "Twelve Slaves Strong as Trees." 
The first half of The Wind Done Gone retells the basic plot of Gone With 
the Wind from the perspective of slaves and servants. The second half of Randall's 
book follows the life of Cynara as she explores the upper echelons of African 
American society during Reconstruction, including a fictional party at Frederick 
Douglass's house in Washington D.C. After recreating Mitchell's world from a 
particular African American perspective, Randall then produces an image of 
African American culture that echoes contemporary theoretical understandings 
of how racial identity works, drawing on an array of contemporary sources 
including Toni Morrison's work on memory and Patricia Williams's approach 
to ownership and "owning the self."9 The Wind Done Gone begins with Gone 
With the Wind as a mythic narrative that plays a central role in creating the 
dominant image of American history and then seeks to deconstruct and 
reconstruct these mythic foundations.10 The Stephens Mitchell's Trust lawsuit 
against Randall and Houghton Mifflin asked the following two questions: (1) 
Was there a substantial similarity between Gone With the Wind and The Wind 
Done Gone? and (2) If there is a substantial similarity between the two, should 
the parodie nature of The Wind Done Gone be considered a fair use of Gone 
With The Wind? 
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In this essay, I explore the legal controversy surrounding publication of 
Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone, which illustrates how African American 
cultural practices and copyright law re-write and re-work one another as each 
grows and develops.11 While the debate about the influence of copyright law 
and intellectual properties in post-Civil Rights era African American culture 
could be traced through the art of Betye Saar, the copyright activism of rapper 
Chuck D, or the recent fiction of Percival Everett, this essay will use The Wind 
Done Gone as a case study to explore the efficacy of recent copyright legislation 
and court decisions.12 In particular, I focus on how cultural texts produce subjects 
and how the very process of identification through cultural texts agitates the 
border of traditional concepts of property and ownership. 
Although The Wind Done Gone controversy brings to light cultural processes 
regarding creativity, textual consumption, the circulation of racial imagery, and 
the deployment of legal discourse, it also proves the adage that cultural 
importance is not the same as legal importance. The litigation and subsequent 
discussion of the case is an exceptional cultural event because relatively few 
books have been subjected to such detailed legal scrutiny and because a wide 
range of writers, publishers, scholars, and activists used the case to address the 
relationship between copyright law and cultural production. The actual legal 
decision and the doctrine that it furthers, however, will likely have only a limited 
legal application because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not develop 
any new doctrines or theories to reorganize copyright law. Moreover, the Court 
affirmed copyright case law by engaging in a fact-intensive reading of the dispute 
that renders it unlikely that other disputes will fit the exact fact pattern established 
in the case. The legal decision, therefore, ultimately failed to protect textual 
producers from claims of coyright infringement. 
For American studies, this controversy provides a crucial opportunity to 
intervene in public debates about the operation and function of American cultural 
relations and processes. Of particular interest to American studies scholars should 
be how the legal system regulates cultural and social matters. In this article, I 
will review the development of copyright law in the United States (which is 
relatively unexplored territory for American studies), explore the link between 
the regulation of creative expression and American studies scholarship, and then 
examine the court records (especially the expert testimony of academics) 
produced during the course of the lawsuit as well as popular descriptions and 
analyses of the case. Because I bring a cultural studies perspective to legal 
discourse, my research does not conflate the statements of any particular actor 
as the "Law" (as much writing by cultural studies scholars on legal matters 
does)13 but considers each statement as one position among a multiplicity of 
positions and arguments that together comprise legal discourse. 
Although no single theoretical approach can fully capture the shifting terrain 
of copyright law, The Wind Done Gone provides an excellent opportunity to 
examine the nature of public dialogue over the idea of intellectual property in a 
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period during which shifts in technology and communication have radically 
altered the spatial and temporal framework that has provided the foundation for 
the property concept.14 The ideals that, at least theoretically, founded the nation, 
including freedom, equality, and democracy, are being re-written as the internet, 
globalization, genetic engineering, and other technological shifts create bold, 
new frontiers for cultural-legal exploration. These developments reshape notions 
of the self and community as they simultaneously transform cultural geography. 
In a universe that is increasingly marked by cyborgs, simulations, and global 
souls, The Wind Done Gone asks its readers to contemplate the very real effects 
of imagined realities such as Gone With the Wind and to rethink selfhood in an 
age of mass media. Who "owns" dominant myths and who has the authority to 
regulate and/or contest those myths constitutes one of the primary and 
foundational questions of American cultural studies. 
Intellectual License or Intellectual Property? 
In order to understand the controversy around The Wind Done Gone, we 
must examine the legal framework within which it was framed. To begin with 
the origins of legal concepts does not privilege legal discourse as a disciplinary 
logic; rather, such a starting point uncovers the debris of previous social debates 
(both legal and cultural) that has provided the intellectual foundation for 
contemporary discourses about ownership and authorship. As with many concepts 
within the law of the United States, the genealogy of property and copyright 
laws descends from English law and political theory.15 Political theory meets 
legal pragmatism in the history of "intellectual property" because the concept 
that we today know as copyright does not derive from a "pure" application of a 
single theory, but from the interplay of theoretical models and very specific 
economic problems. Moreover, the concept of "intellectual property" has 
developed from uneasy extensions of theories about real and movable property 
to the realm of ideas and expression. In this shift from tangible to intangible 
property, the very definition of what it means to "own" something begins to 
unravel. The slippage regarding ownership becomes particularly significant for 
American studies scholars as the "ownership" of property and (cultural) 
"authority" begin to blend into one another within much public discourse.16 
John Locke's treatise on the origin of property has shaped the definition 
and application of the concepts of ownership and property in American law. 
Locke argued that if someone removed something from the state of nature and 
added labor to it and joined to it something of his/her own, it became his/her 
property.17 For Locke and many contemporary thinkers, ownership over property 
meant that the "owner is allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-
matter uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people 
from such interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all but one, and is 
accountable to no one."18 
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Locke's framework, however, has presented conceptual difficulties when 
applying his land-based metaphors/fictions to production, consumption, and 
regulation of ideas and expression. Intellectual texts are not technically 
"property" under contemporary legal doctrine. As a secondary or tertiary step 
in a property-based epistemology in a liberal legal state, Locke's enlightenment 
vision merged with romantic assumptions about genius and creativity to create 
a notion of copyright that was "founded on the concept of the unique individual 
who creates something original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labors."19 
In other words, the public commitment to allocate substantial, if not exclusive, 
control over the expression of an idea (i.e., a novel, poem, film, song, screenplay, 
etc.) follows from Locke's premise that the "author" mixed her intellectual and 
imaginative labor with a natural resource (such as language, musical notation, a 
movie location) and produced something wholly new. The romantic concepts of 
authorship and creativity transformed a messy complex of inspirations, models, 
teachers, and critics that shape a given intellectual product into "natural" 
resources to be mined, refined, and then sold as a commodity. In the realm of 
ideas, ownership activities include, but are not limited to, the right to copy and 
distribute and the authority to license other users. However, these ownership 
rights are further limited by a number of doctrines that undermine the application 
of Locke's theory to the realm of ideas and creation. Copyright (and patent) law 
transformed ownership from a tangible, physical, and material relationship with 
a specific object to a more ephemeral relationship that allows the "owner" to 
authorize the use, reproduction, and distribution of an expression of an idea, but 
not a generalized or paraphrased version of the idea. 
The first step in this re-casting of ownership in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence began in 1710, when the English Parliament passed the Statute of 
Anne and created modern copyright.20 Previously, the Crown of England had 
controlled publishing by extending monopoly rights to publishers to produce 
specific types of works, thus regulating who could publish what. The Statute of 
Anne, however, lifted Royal control from publishing and pulled a step back 
from full-blown printer monopolies by adding a time limit on such monopolies 
(14 years for new books—renewable for another 14 years—and 21 years for 
classics already printed by a publisher) as incentive to writers for increased 
public knowledge.21 These newly-created time limits provided an opportunity 
for books to enter the public domain. This shift was also dramatic because 
monopoly rights of limited ownership over the expression of ideas were 
transferred from Royal control to the marketplace. What should be noted about 
this legislation is that it primarily regulated the interests of publishers, not writers! 
While publishers invoked the romantic theory of authorship in their rhetoric 
supporting the Statute of Anne, the final version of the legislation did not produce 
much legal protection for writers, only publishers.22 
English law ruled the thirteen colonies and individual American states, 
laying the intellectual and legal background for the framers of the United States 
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Constitution. While it may have revised other aspects of English law and political 
theory, the Constitution adopted primarily English ideas and laws on copyright. 
The Constitution stated that Congress shall have the power "to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."23 
Within the Constitutional schema, copyright was by definition a limited right. 
Perhaps even more important, such rights were secured in order to promote the 
progress of science and the arts, thus balancing individual and societal interests, 
not conveying a purely individual interest! Although I would not argue that 
English copyright law's inclusion into the foundation of American law suggested 
the founders' full-fledged commitment to any particular position vis-à-vis the 
romantic theory of authorship, it nonetheless contradicts the idea that writers 
have a permanent or even semi-permanent right24 in their products once those 
products enter the public sphere.25 If anything, the inclusion of English law on 
copyright in the Constitution signaled a desire (albeit a conflicted desire) to 
maintain (at least theoretically) a public sphere where social problems can be 
discussed and examined.26 
After the Constitution was adopted, United States and English copyright 
law diverged because England, relying much more on the romantic conception 
of authorship, created stronger rules favoring the rights of writers (and publishers) 
over those of the public. Perhaps because of the popularity of republican theories 
within nineteenth-century America, the United States hesitated to strengthen 
copyright protections to match European legal standards. In Wheaton v. Peters 
( 1834), the Supreme Court upheld the Constitutional focus on the public domain 
and the public good that followed from publication and denied Wheaton's cause 
for copyright infringement against Peters.27 Meredith McGill has argued that 
Wheaton "buil[t] into American law a resistance to individual control over texts" 
and that "the nature of copyright [in the early nineteenth century] neither 
establishefd] the text as a commodity nor ground[ed] the right to literary property 
in the person of the author."28 
Surprising to this cultural studies practitioner, legal discourse in the 
nineteenth century articulated a position toward readership that has certain 
affinities to the understandings produced by reader response theory.29 For 
example, in the 1853 case of Stowe v. Thomas (which concerned an unauthorized 
translation of Uncle Tom s Cabin into German), the Circuit Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania expounded on the nature of copyright: 
An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both of 
the ideas contained in his book, and the combination of words 
to represent them. Before publication he has the exclusive 
possession of his invention [as personal, not intellectual 
property]. His dominion is perfect. But when he has published 
his book, and given his thoughts, sentiments, knowledge or 
discoveries to the world, he can have no longer an exclusive 
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possession of them. Such an appropriation becomes 
impossible, and is inconsistent with the object of publication. 
The author's conceptions have become the common property 
of his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor 
of their right to communicate them to another clothed in their 
own language, by lecture or by treatise . . . . When he has sold 
his book, the only property which he reserves to himself, or 
which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply 
the copies of that particular combination of characters which 
exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be 
conveyed. This is what the law terms copy, or copyright.30 
Although only a statement of a lower court, Justice Grier clearly 
acknowledged that once a book was published and read by an audience, readers 
come to "own" texts as they "bec[a]me the common property of his readers." 
Moreover, Grier reminded Stowe that the only protection that copyright law 
provided during the antebellum era was from piracy of her book within the 
United States.31 Interestingly and probably unwittingly, Justice Grier's decision 
in effect licensed the subsequent efforts of African American writers and 
intellectuals to "rewrite" or "write over" Stowe's characterization of Uncle Tom.32 
Grier's understanding, however, of the public's ownership of what they read 
and the dialogue that books produce has not (much to the probable chagrin of 
most cultural studies scholars) been carried forward to the present. The economic 
interests of publishing houses and writers demanded that legal discourse protect 
the investments of publishers and writers. 
Because of the differences between United States and European copyright 
laws, piracy flourished on both sides of the Atlantic during the nineteenth century. 
Publishers within the United States pirated European works and vice versa. 
"While authors sought to control the production and sale of their texts amidst 
widespread literary piracy," according to Martin Buinicki, "those opposed to 
strengthening or expanding copyright law often cited fear of granting monopoly 
power to authors and large publishing firms, robbing the reading public of access 
to affordably priced books."33 To protect the style and tone of their work, some 
writers sought to use trademark protection as a substitute for the limited protection 
of nineteenth-century copyright law. Melissa Homestead has demonstrated how 
the success of Fanny Fern, a prominent newspaper columnist who dispensed 
homespun wisdom on a wide range of topics, required that she vigorously defend 
her "trademark" style from unauthorized reprints and imitations, lest her 
reputation and the value of her own writings become diluted through piracy.34 
Washington Irving, Bret Harte, and Mark Twain each tried (with various measures 
of success) to use trademark law to protect access to and control over their 
writings. 
By the 1870s, an alliance of interests pushed for changes in copyright law 
that reflected more fully the romantic conception of authorship. The interests of 
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American authors, American publishing houses, and foreign publishing houses 
converged to promote expanded copyright protection of books to match European 
standards of copyright.35 Because cheap, low-priced versions of British novels 
had flooded the United States market, copyright reform constituted a victory for 
international publishers. By strengthening international copyright and by sharing 
copyright protection with England in 1891, the United States ended the pirating 
of English books and, in effect, allowed homegrown writers to compete on an 
even playing field with their European counterparts because publishers had to 
pay royalties to both American and foreign writers.36 This shift in copyright law 
constituted a victory for publishers and writers, who would be now compensated 
for their writings. 
A second factor that helped push copyright law in the direction of romantic 
authorship was the growing disarray in the publishing industry in the 1870s. 
The gap in copyright law that permitted publishers within the United States to 
publish cheap pirated editions of European books helped the major New York 
publishers create the "courtesy" system in which publishing houses divided up 
the pirated works and had a gentleman's agreement in which they agreed not to 
compete. (Even though they did not compete with one another, American versions 
of European books were still much cheaper). In 1875, Donnelly, Loyd, and Co., 
a Chicago publisher, created the Lakeside Library of classics. Donnelly destroyed 
the "courtesy" system of publishing and began the growth of penny presses that 
lowered prices substantially on the already cheap versions of European books. 
In order to restore equilibrium to the publishing market, the major New York 
publishers urged Congress to join the international copyright movement and 
strengthen national copyright laws to diminish competition in the sale of 
literature.37 
The third part of this constellation of forces that changed copyright law 
around the turn of the twentieth century were writers. One of the loudest authorial 
voices for copyright law reform was Mark Twain, who began researching 
copyright law after his own work had been pirated. Twain, the "folksiest" of 
American writers, sought to "push his rather 'un-American' ideas about copyright 
in distinctly 'American' language."38 In other words, Twain countered republican 
sentiments of a strong democratic public sphere (reminiscent of republican 
rhetoric during the early years of the Republic) and adopted the less egalitarian 
European approach to copyright. The success of copyright reforms in 1891 (the 
passing of legislation on international copyright) and 1909 (expanding the 
definition and extending the term of copyright), however, reflected more than a 
victory for authorial rights. It validated more fully than ever before Lockean 
principles of property for intellectual labor. By extending Lockean metaphors 
to the act of writing, other problems developed as advocates for authorial control 
sought to enlarge their rights by expanding the scope of those rights to encroach 
upon the intellectual labor of readers and consumers. To expand the ownership 
interest of the copyright holder, cultural authority regarding the work in question 
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also passed over to the copyright holder. This, in turn, further diminished the 
role of the public and the public domain in distributing and interpreting the 
work. 
Since 1909, the balance between public sphere and the rights of the author 
has shifted in favor of the author, in its own right, or as a proxy for corporate 
interests. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of limited monopoly, or 
literary licenses, for writers in their creations for the public good have moved 
ever closer to the idea of intellectual property, with all the connotations that 
property brings with it. While the terrain has shifted to different issues, such as 
derivative works, works for hire, joint authorship, parody, in each conflict the 
same theoretical justifications have been brought to bear. 
Whether copyright law provides "literary license" or literary property is 
not a settled question (and one that probably cannot and will not ever be answered 
fully). Legal and public discourses currently lean toward a theory of literary 
property, a position articulated by Stephen Carter in his essay, "Does it Matter 
Whether Intellectual Property is Property?" He writes: 
[SJcholars write about whether intellectual property is 
property. Nobody else seems to care. Certainly practitioners 
and judges—the traditional audiences for legal scholarship-
are more concerned with the proper adjustment to Section 
103 of the Patent Act to take account of university research 
styles than with whether those university researchers happen 
to discover what is properly considered "property."39 
Carter urged abolition of the special status of intellectual property (and, in turn, 
a revision of the Constitution) and the application of traditional property law 
concepts to copyrights, trademarks, and patents.40 He argued that property 
doctrines (particularly the rules on antitrust) are sufficient to balance individual 
and societal interests for copyrights, trademarks, and patents. According to Carter, 
legal discourse only creates inefficiencies with its consideration of the amorphous 
categories of the public domain and the public sphere. By relying on a blend of 
pragmatism and economic theory, Carter dispensed with the few remaining 
features of republican rhetoric within copyright law.41 
In the following sections, my goal will be to use The Wind Done Gone 
controversy to demonstrate that any attempt to collapse the distinction between 
intellectual property and other forms of property is a disastrous step. As I have 
attempted to point out in retelling the history of the copyright, the physical 
relationship between object and person that is central to real (i.e., land) or chattel 
(i.e., things or objects) property has no analog with regard to the expression of 
ideas, which are subject to the laws of copyrights, trademarks, and patents. 
Moreover, Locke's myth of the creation of physical property totally fails to 
capture how intellectual discoveries operate. Rather than occurring in a 
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theoretical state of nature, the creation of books, artworks, and manufacturing 
processes require an active and vibrant culture that provides the impetus, reason, 
or motivation for the creative or inventive act. Moreover, such acts tend to build 
on the work of others. No intellectual or inventor is an island. Recent attempts 
to fold intellectual and scientific work into "property" represents a problem 
distinct from the effort in legal discourse to adequately theorize cultural processes. 
Instead, I will argue for an approach to copyright law that emphasizes limited 
monopoly rights not just in terms of the time-period of the monopoly, but the 
scope and reach of the copyright as well. 
American Studies and "Intellectual Property" 
For American studies scholars, the debate over "intellectual 
property"represents a problem distinct from the efforts in legal discourse to 
balance the rights of writer, publisher, and public in a given text. Rather than 
seeking to deconstruct authorship (although some American studies scholarship 
has followed this path), the interest of American studies turns (or, in my 
estimation, should turn) the matter of "intellectual property" upside down. The 
logic of "intellectual property" as currently debated by legal scholars,42 economic 
scholars, and even by most literary and cultural studies scholars focuses first 
and foremost on the writer, director, or musician who "creates" a work or text. 
In American studies, the question of audiences and the "intellectual properties" 
of social groups should constitute the primary emphasis of examination. In other 
words, most scholarship on intellectual property focuses on the copyright holder. 
What I want to examine is the importance of the public and the public domain in 
copyright law. 
Recent work in American studies has focused on what stories should be 
central to the public domain, what myths, stories, narratives, and images are 
central for understanding America.43 Rather than assume one giant public domain, 
universally shared, American studies has increasingly viewed the "American 
imagination" as multi-layered and hierarchical. Contemporary American studies 
classics, such as Reading the Romance, Mechanic Accents, Watching Race, 
Immigrant Acts, and Telling Identities, each described the intellectual terrain or 
operations of particular social groups.44 These works turned the idea of 
"intellectual property" on its head because (1) they focused as much or more on 
the consumption of textual objects or the reformulation of dominant narratives 
in the production of resistant texts45 and (2) the notion of the public sphere 
theorized and examined was plural (i.e., public spheres) and overlapping rather 
than the generalized imagined national public implied by dominant constructions 
of intellectual property within legal discourse. In these studies, scholars examined 
the cultural life of texts in the public domain. This approach intentionally 
undermined the authority (but not the ownership interests) of the producers and 
distributers of the texts under consideration. Ironically, such studies may have 
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increased the monetary value of a given text, while undermining the cultural 
authority of its producer. 
The American studies focus on the cultural life of texts and ideas has not 
proven effective in transforming copyright law. Instead, a workable conception 
of the imaginary domain must be developed as a potential solution to tensions 
within copyright law. Drucilla Cornell has defined the imaginary domain as the 
social terrain into which the individual places herself by selecting and then 
attempting to accomplish a particular vision of herself.46 For Cornell, the primary 
difference that must be re-visioned through a construction of the imaginary 
domain was feminine difference.47 The imaginary domain, according to Cornell, 
must become a freer, more equitable realm so that invidious stereotypes do not 
limit who people are and what they can accomplish. Cornell's imaginary domain 
was not a monolithic construction that cannot account for operations of difference, 
alternative imaginary domains, or counter-hegemonic spaces. Rather, Cornell 
sought to safeguard the existence and functioning of such imaginary spaces 
through legal discourse. In other words, her understanding of the imaginary 
domain is premised on the contention that conflicts in culture and politics are 
not simply differences of opinion or interests that can be discussed rationally, 
but differences based in psychic investments and the production of subjectivity.48 
The theorization of the existence of psychic harms due to racism, sexism, 
and colonialism was not, in itself, a new development. Cornell's work is important 
for American studies scholars precisely because she (along with critical race 
theorists)49 attempted to translate the contentions of critical theory and cultural 
studies scholarship into the language of legal discourse, rather than throwing 
out the baby (of liberal legal discourse) with the bathwater (i.e., the racialized 
nature of contemporary dominant discourse) and reinvent the embodiments (both 
theoretical and applied) of equality and freedom that already exist in American 
legal discourse. 
In terms of copyright law, a more complex understanding of how the 
imagination works could radically alter how legal discourse regulates and 
distributes ownership interests and cultural authority. Michel de Certeau 
provocatively described reading as "poaching." "Whether it is a question of 
newspapers or Proust, the text has a meaning only through its readers: it changes 
along with them; it is ordered in accord with codes of perception that it does not 
control" [emphasis added].50 For de Certeau, reading connected the material 
object (i.e., the text) to the imagination. De Certeau's goal in The Practices of 
Everyday Life was to shift the academic gaze from the productive labor of the 
writer to the productive labor of the reader. For de Certeau and cultural studies 
scholars who embrace his theoretical model,51 mental activity constituted a 
necessary realm for understanding social and cultural relations. Currently such 
mental "actions" have no protection within the United States's current intellectual 
property regime because an intellectual property is created only when it is set 
into a material form.52 As a result, consumers have no legal control over the 
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mental labor that they perform on a given text, unless they create an original 
product based on their efforts. 
Tracing the effects of consumption practices on cultural values and meanings 
without examining the shift (or lack of shift) in proprietary relationships 
constitutes an incomplete cultural studies methodology. In Textual Poachers, 
Henry Jenkins provided some tantalizing examples of how copyright law limited 
the kinds of rituals, practices, and habits in which film and television fans could 
engage. Despite offering such illustrations, Jenkins did not consider the broader 
relationship between law and culture. Culture remained a relatively free-standing 
entity, free from the regulation of state authorities and private proprietary 
interests. Jenkins concluded: "[t]he nature of fan creation challenges the media 
industry's claims to hold copyright on popular narratives. Once television 
characters enter into a broader circulation, intrude into our living rooms, pervade 
the fabric of our society, they belong to their audience and not simply the artists 
who originated them."53 In a sense, Jenkins was correct in arguing that audience 
members have "ownership" over popular texts, but that ownership interest is 
not one currently recognized in legal discourse. If not recognized legally, then 
the ability to control its use and circulation is limited. In other words, the audience 
has little "authority" vis-à-vis a given text. The very autonomy that Jenkins 
sought to identify and explain is in fact regulated and constrained by legal 
discourse. 
Currently, the only partial limitation on the public/private dichotomy within 
the discourses concerning United States copyright law has been the attempt to 
develop a Native American exception to copyright law that would allow for 
some amount of collective ownership of cultural products and processes.54 
Although not endorsed or adopted by Congress, such attempts would provide a 
necessary corrective to copyright law, and such proposals may help American 
studies scholars rethink the public/private dichotomy deployed by legal discourse. 
While copyright law does acknowledge some limited instances of joint 
authorship,55 courts tend to prefer copyright arrangements with singular authors 
(even if those authors are corporate entities).56 As will become clear in the next 
section, legal discourse, whether in the litigant's or the court's textual productions, 
has not considered that multiple publics and multiple subjectivities might exist 
within the territorial borders of the United States. Legal discourse (even in the 
very astute but frequently arcane commentary of copyright law in law reviews) 
cannot conceive of cultural borders distinct from national or territorial borders. 
The result is that legal discourse is burdened with a conception of culture (and 
authorship) that cannot make sense of claims of cultural or communal ownership 
made either by dominant or by emergent social groups. 
Despite its importance in distributing the monetary rewards derived from a 
given text, a copyright does not remove a text from circulation within the public 
domain. Rather, a copyright is increasingly the mark that signifies entry into 
public discourse, but under conditions that allow the copyright holder to guard 
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against literal and even some metaphorical piracy.57 Even though legal discourse 
suggests that copyrighted items are not within the public domain, American 
studies should insist that a copyright does not remove a text from the public 
domain; it only protects it from certain unauthorized acts of reproduction. An 
American studies perspective on copyright law should constantly remind legal 
scholars and the public that a copyright does not remove a text from circulating 
within the public domain, but merely allows the copyright holder a certain limited 
authority to regulate that circulation. 
From another angle of vision, it should be noted that academics and 
intellectuals frequently claim a similar kind of authority over texts fully within 
the public domain and even some copyrighted texts. As cultural "authorities," 
scholars and intellectuals through their scholarship attempt to alter and thus 
regulate the reproduction, distribution, and circulation of texts and images 
(whether or not such things are technically copyrighted). During the culture 
wars of the 1980s and 1990s, cultural "authorities" selected texts to enter into 
or remove from the canon and sought to rewrite both dominant and emerging 
imaginary domains by acknowledging the overlapping network of national and 
cultural myths in existence within the territory of the United States.58 Such active 
regeneration of foundational myths, not surprisingly, produced a strong counter-
reaction by conservatives and created debates about cultural authority and in a 
more general sense "ownership" over the "Western Canon."59 In effect, many 
(but not all) cultural conservatives sought a copyright-like kind of ownership 
interest in the "Western Canon." Of course, copyright law did not recognize 
such attempts to control the production and distribution of these materials even 
if the rhetoric defending the "Western Canon" frequently included the 
metaphorical references to property and ownership. 
There are, of course, significant differences between the cultural authority 
of the "Western Canon" and the bundle of rights produced by copyright law. In 
my critical analysis of each, however, what they may share is even more 
important: each constitutes part of the images, symbols, and metaphors that 
people use to understand, order, and critique their experiences, beliefs, and 
everyday routines. In more common traditional American studies terminology, 
the "myths and symbols" that varied Americans may use remain in the public 
domain even if a given text may be copyrighted. Once an image, idea, or phrase 
becomes ingrained in any of the many public discourses within American culture, 
copyright law prohibits a narrow range of reproduction, distribution, and 
circulation. 
Despite the tenor of recent decisions in copyright cases, the goal of many 
writers is not simply to accumulate money (although that is certainly a goal) but 
to have a profound effect on the social imagination. What better way to allow 
such effects to flourish than by opening up the cultural ownership rights to their 
works? Safeguarding the imaginary domain and freeing individuals and social 
groups to liberate themselves from a limited referential universe should be the 
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focus of copyright law (which I think is the unstated argument behind Randall's 
claim for copyright).60 While it is all too common to suggest that copyright 
holders now have too much control over their texts, the rationales for curtailing 
that control has proved elusive.61 A renewed focus on liberating people and 
social groups can help forge a more equitable balance between private interest 
and public domains. The Wind Done Gone controversy provides an opportunity 
to examine the contours of such overlapping domains. 
The Wind Done Gone Controversy 
and the (Black?) Imaginary Domain 
Copyright law has not been terribly kind to historically marginalized groups; 
dominant peoples have often utilized minority cultures as resources to be 
developed and then sold within the capitalist economy. Alice Randall's The 
Wind Done Gone reverses this historical pattern. In response to the continuing 
popularity of Gone With the Wind, Randall sought to "write over" it.62 She decided 
to produce a parody of Gone With The Wind after a popular exhibit on the 
costumes from the movie version of the book ran in Nashville, Randall's 
hometown, and she noted that "the exhibit didn't comprehend that it might be 
painful to part of the community."63 
Despite subsequent interviews, it is not entirely clear when Randall's book 
became identified as a parody. According to the district court (which ruled against 
Randall), Houghton Mifflin, its publisher, did not explicitly claim that The Wind 
Done Gone was a parody until after litigation had begun in the case.64 By 
identifying Randall's book as a parody in its marketing campaign, Houghton 
Mifflin65 sought protection under the fair use doctrine of copyright law and 
created the expectation for its readers that the novel parodies66 as well as criticizes 
the original because parody, at least legally, would permit borrowing from the 
original. In other words, without a claim of parody the defense of fair use might 
be unavailable and it would be more likely that the book would constitute an 
infringement of copyright.67 
For the purposes of American studies scholars, this lawsuit represents just 
one example of how copyright law sets the framework for cultural production.68 
The primary questions that this stage of the lawsuit presented were: (1) Was 
there a substantial similarity between Gone With the Wind and The Wind Done 
Gone? and (2) If there is a substantial similarity between the two, should the 
parodie nature of The Wind Done Gone be considered a fair use of Gone With 
The Wind} 
To answer these questions, both sides submitted affidavits and letters from 
distinguished sets of writers, intellectuals and scholars. The heirs of Gone With 
the Wind submitted expert testimony from Kevin J. Anderson, a science fiction 
writer; Gabriel Mottola, an expert in Jewish and Holocaust literature who taught 
classes in parody and satire; Joel Conarroe, an expert in poetry; Louis Rubin, 
Jr., an expert in southern literary studies; and Alan Lelchuk, a writer and expert 
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in European and Jewish literature, among others. The absence of any scholars 
of African American literature or culture among the plaintiff's bevy of experts 
is particularly noteworthy. Although the court did not specifically address issues 
of "cultural expertise" in its opinion, the lawyers for Mitchell's heirs attempted 
to create ostensibly "colorblind" knowledge structures, including parody, 
southern history, and the writing of derivative works, which then formed the 
basis for establishing race-neutral or "un-raced" forms of knowledge.69 In all of 
their submissions to the court, the lawyers for the Mitchell heirs sought to frame 
the issues of the case solely within a "colorblind" framework to make invisible 
how race complicated the issues in the case.70 
For American studies practitioners, cultural theorists, and legal scholars, 
the decision of the Mitchell estate's lawyers to diminish the role that particular 
readers and viewers of Gone With the Wind play in shaping its meaning and 
value was a critical one for understanding cultural debates about the scope and 
meaning of copyright. Such a tactic, however, only furthered Randall's claim 
that her intervention was as much critical as it was "inventive" or "creative." 
The Wind Done Gone criticized precisely the racialized imaginary that sought 
to describe itself as "unraced" or "colorblind." Thus, the Mitchell estate's 
litigation strategy itself heightened and underscored the importance of Randall's 
intervention into the effects of Gone With the Wind. 
Another problem with the Mitchell estate's strategy was that it flew in the 
face of the shifting rules for canonization in the academy during the post-Civil 
Rights era. To critics and supporters of multiculturalism alike, it was clear that 
race-, gender-, and class-"neutral" approaches to literature, history, and culture 
no longer constituted the only ideal in shaping the meaning and value of written 
texts and social processes. Regardless of whether one saw this as positive or 
negative development, the appeal to such race-neutral categories in a case about 
the racialized effects of Gone With the Wind constituted a poor tactical choice. 
While I do not doubt that the Stephens Mitchell Trust viewed Randall's work as 
falling under the "colorblind" rules of copyright infringement, it should have 
become immediately clear to the trust and its lawyers that such an approach 
would fail to acknowledge Randall's race-based critique of Gone With the Wind.11 
Shifting constructions of academic knowledge requires a shift in the legal rules 
that regulate textual production. As the standards of interpretation change, the 
rules regulating the ownership of texts must change with them, otherwise the 
contradictions between discursive spheres becomes too great and risks 
destabilizing and delegitimizing each sphere. Because of the interdisciplinary 
nature of American studies inquiry, one of the goals of such scholarship should 
be to work through and resolve these tensions. 
Based on their pre- or anti-multicultural forms of analysis, the experts for 
the Mitchell heirs concluded that The Wind Done Gone borrows heavily, if not 
exclusively, on the original. They submitted an affidavit from Gabriel Motola, 
an expert in satire and parody. Of Randall's novel, Motola writes: "In the case 
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of The Wind Done Gone, the reader's imagination is always anchored to Gone 
With the Wind precisely because of the constant appropriation of Magaret 
Mitchell's characters, language, and plot."72 According to Alan Lelchuk, 
Randall's book was "a subliterary parasitical work... [having] no literary voice, 
no substantial style, or character to remember." He also reasoned that The Wind 
Done Gone "is not satire or parody . . . [because] [t]here is no consistency here, 
of style, tone, or attitude of critical mockery." Lelchuk concluded that the book 
has "little or no literary value."73 These comments focused primarily on aesthetic 
analyses that are oblivious to all consideration of racial subjectivity as a matter 
for art. In the closing lines of his affidavit, Lelchuk admited that telling Gone 
With the Wind from a black viewpoint might be a literary endeavor, but Randall's 
version failed to live up to this lofty goal. Kevin Anderson, an expert on writing 
sequel or spinoff novels, argued that Randall "has commandeered Margaret 
Mitchell's original characters, situations, and storylines without regard to the 
wishes or intent of the legitimate copyright holders" and that "this 
misappropriation . . . would seriously taint the original property for further 
development."74 
Lelchuk, Mottola, and Anderson's readings of and testimony about The 
Wind Done Gone reflected an analysis of the book based on legal standards for 
copyright that failed to acknowledge or address the broader cultural or literary 
issues at hand. Lelchuk's comments, for instance, neglected the stylistic and 
literary differences between a book told through third person narration and one 
developed through a series of first-person diary entries of a character who did 
not exist in the original. If Randall had merely converted Mitchell's third-person 
novel into a first-person narrative purporting to be Scarlett's diary, then she 
would have infringed on the Mitchell estate's copyright because Randall would 
have simply transferred the story from one genre to another. However, Randall 
created characters and perspectives entirely absent from Gone With the Wind, 
exploring the gaps in Mitchell's vision of the South. Lelchuk's testimony ignored 
these differences because he sought to increase the Stephens Mitchell trust's 
copyright to include anything remotely connected to Gone With The Wind. 
Similarly, Anderson's testimony/argument spoke directly to the possible 
dilution of value of the Mitchell estate, and its contention that it would lose 
control over the licensing of subsequent works were the public suddenly to lose 
interest in Gone With the Wind.15 Neither Anderson nor Lelchuk contended, 
however, that Mitchell's initial work captured in full the ideas or expressions of 
the African American characters and culture or the responses of African American 
readers. By removing the racialized nature of the book and its reception, the 
Mitchell estate sought to enlarge their copyright ownership to a world that 
Mitchell could barely—and did not—imagine or express.76 Their argument 
attempted to turn back the clock on literary and cultural analysis to an earlier 
period where texts and cultural practices were reduced to self-contained objects 
that existed in a world apart from audiences and cultural politics. 
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Louis Rubin Jr., a southern literary historian who edited a collection on 
Gone With the Wind, developed a provocative attack on Randall's parody. In his 
testimony, Rubin argued that The Wind Done Gone cannot be a criticism of the 
original because "the racial stereotypes have long since been exploded, and it 
would be difficult to imagine many contemporary readers who believe that the 
depiction of the black-white, slave-master relationships in Gone With the Wind 
are historically realistic."77 In order to attack the claim of fair use by Randall 
and Houghton Mifflin, he asserted that because the stereotypes described in 
Gone With the Wind were no longer commonly held, they therefore cannot be 
the subject of fair use. 
Rubin's premise was faulty or at least inaccurate because it did not account 
for the continued popularity of the book and its image of the South. Why is 
Gone with the Wind and its licensed products still so popular if everyone knows 
it is a racist fabrication of events?78 An alternative—and to me more compelling— 
explanation is that the book remains popular because of its stereotyped 
depictions. Whether people believe such depictions are accurate is irrelevant, 
rather what matters is the continuing effects of such admittedly false depictions. 
Rubin apparently believed that fair use applies only if factual material—narrowly 
defined—is at issue. Of course, the fair use exception to copyright ownership 
does not make such a distinction. More importantly, the very popularity of this 
fiction or fantasy suggests that it is precisely the kind of text whose "life" and 
"ownership" have exceeded the bounds of creativity imparted by the author. 
The continuing popularity of Gone With the Wind can no longer be solely 
attributable to the work of Margaret Mitchell.79 Copyright law as currently 
conceived needs to incorporate the insights of reader response theory and 
consumption theory in cultural studies to address such complexities. 
In contrast to the "color-blind" version of intellectual property offered by 
the Mitchell trust, the lawyers for Houghton Mifflin and Alice Randall argued 
that The Wind Done Gone was not substantially similar to Gone With The Wind 
or if it were, it constituted a fair use of Mitchell's book as a parody. Their position 
was supported by affidavits and letters from a wide range of academics, scholars, 
and authors who study African American literature, history, philosophy, and 
culture.80 Randall's experts, like those of the Mitchell trust, deployed a variety 
of arguments, not all of which easily meshed with legal discourse, the primary 
discursive structure in deciding whether The Wind Done Gone would be 
published. ' 
The most interesting expert evidence submitted by Randall was proffered 
by Nobel-prize winning novelist and long-time editor Toni Morrison and by 
Harvard scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. The majority of Morrison's testimony 
focused on the nature of textual production. She testified: 
This process of being simulated by one narrative into a 
writer's own literary invention is virtually the history of 
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literature. There would be no Ulysses by James Joyce without 
Homer; no Pygmalion by George Bernard Shaw without 
Ovid's The Metamorphosis', no "My Fair Lady" without 
Pygmalion. More recent examples include John Updike's 
Gertrude and Claudius, a wholly re-imagined tale of two 
characters in Hamlet. A list of such responses to earlier stories 
is very long indeed, and the subject of masses of literary 
scholarship.81 
Morrison's statement combined the thesis of her essay "Unspeakable Things 
Unspoken" (that an unspoken black presence has haunted white writers) with 
Harold Bloom's The Anxiety of Influence (which sought to de-mythologize the 
romantic conception of authorship—the center of the rhetoric around which 
copyright law is based).82 Unlike the testimony offered by Suntrust's lawyers, 
Morrison sought to demonstrate how textual productions constitute responses 
to cultural conditions rather than wholesale creations of new worlds. More 
significantly, Morrison suggested that it is precisely the task of writers to "re-
write" or "write over" older stories. What is unique (and therefore copyrightable) 
about a particular story, according to Morrison's logic, is the narrative viewpoint 
and the subjectivities explored rather than the mere existence of similar characters 
or plots.83 Morrison's testimony argued for an approach to creative production 
that emphasized copyright law's ability to promote new artistic productions by 
re-reading copyright law to restrict its application to the problem of piracy (i.e., 
wrongful reproduction of copies) as suggested by the early history of copyright 
law legislation in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Within Morrison's attempt to shift the theoretical basis of copyright law 
(vis-à-vis the nature of intellectual production), she specifically attacked the 
Mitchell estate's claim that the stories were "substantially similar" based on her 
understanding of the racialized nature of subjectivity and experience within the 
United States during the twentieth century. It was only in a brief passage that 
Morrison undermined the "colorblind" approach to intellectual property law 
that the plaintiff had been suggesting. Morrison stated that "The Wind Done 
Gone neither follows nor copies, nor exploits Gone With The Wind. What Miss. 
Randall's book does is imagine and occupy narrative spaces and silences never 
once touched upon nor conceived of in Mrs. Mitchell's novel: that is the interior 
lives of slaves and ex-slaves, their alternate views; their different journey."[errors 
in original]84 Emphasizing the historically-located and dramatically different 
racial subjectivities that each writer brought to her writings and represented in 
her texts, these two sentences rejected the claim that Mitchell's and Randall's 
works were substantially similar. Moreover, and of even greater import, it allowed 
for the possibility of more than one African American version. 
For Morrison (and cultural studies scholars as well), therefore, any 
discussion of similarities between these texts must consider how racial identity 
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shapes cultural production and consumption. Legal discourse, however, does 
not at least formally acknowledge such a position. In the decision of the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Court came close to acknowledging 
how differing racial subjectivities might shape the story, but it ultimately framed 
such differing perspectives as secondary to the stylistic and plot differences.85 
The question that Morrison raised is whether Mitchell or any writer could "own" 
unexamined and probably never considered racial subjectivities. To permit such 
individual ownership of multiple perspectives of a story constitutes a stunning 
frustration of public dialogue over sensitive matters such as race, ethnicity, 
gender, and sexuality. 
Within the idea/expression dichotomy, a racial subjectivity could and should 
constitute a distinctive expression of an idea. Because only individual expressions 
of ideas are protected by copyright, different expressions of an idea, including 
one from a different racial subjectivity, should be separately copyrightable (even 
if the work refers to copyrighted characters). One could argue that such a situation 
is already governed by the concept of derivative works, which the copyright 
statute defines as "a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgement, condensation or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adopted."86 It is clear that the examples in this lengthy list are 
mostly concerned primarily with translating or adapting a copyrighted text from 
one form (say, a novel) to another form (say, a movie) and do not extend to 
expressions of different perspectives that the copyrighted text may have elicited. 
Therefore, because The Wind Done Gone did substantially more than transfer 
the story from one form to another, it would not fall within the derivative works 
category even if the Court found similarities between the two books. The 
similarities that did exist between the two books allowed Randall to demonstrate 
the faulty premises on which Gone With the Wind stood and offered a foundation 
for a counter-narrative. In effect, she attempted to create a different—more just— 
imaginary domain, where some African Americans could imagine themselves 
within popular culture but free from dominant stereotypes. In many ways, 
Randall's re-writing of Gone With the Wind was the fictional analogue to the 
revision of literary and historical canons during the 1980s and 1990s. Rather 
than signaling theft or infringement, The Wind Done Gone served as a reminder 
of the possibility of public dialogue about serious issues. If American studies 
can demonstrate how audience reception and response is a fundamental part of 
the democratic enterprise, then a rewriting of copyright law might be 
accomplished. 
Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s testimony built on Morrison's and described how 
The Wind Done Gone exemplified a specifically African American version of 
parody, known as signifyin'. Gates wrote in his declaration: 
African Americans have used parody since slavery to "fight 
back" against their masters. The dance called "the cake walk" 
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was one of the earliest examples in which black slaves imitated 
and mocked the dancing practices and dress of white 
slaveholders and created their own dance out of this parody 
of the original. The result was so hilarious that it became a 
national craze at the turn-of-the century . . . . The Wind Done 
Gone is a classic parody, in a long line of literary creations 
that extend back to the Ancient Greeks. As the definition of 
parody cited above indicates, parody in literature can only be 
effective when a previously published work is revised, 
imitated, riffed, or "signified" upon. 
Expanding on Morrison's discussion of creativity, Gates provided a 
corrective to the traditional paradigm of artistic creation embedded in copyright 
law. Using parody and its appearance within African American cultural practices 
(a possibility not seriously considered by the Stephens Mitchell Trusts experts, 
who located parody and satire solely within the writings of European and white 
Americans), Gates revised the narrative about the creation of artistic products. 
More importantly for scholars, Gates noted that criticism (what we do as 
American studies scholars) requires that its practitioners evoke and then re-
work the ideas and experiences of others. Most significantly, Gates located textual 
production and consumption within particular discursive communities. He then 
asserted that "Gone With the Wind—especially in its book form—is widely 
regarded by the black community as one of the most racist depictions of slavery 
and black slaves in American literature."87 Although a more thorough 
documentary record would be needed definitively to establish the validity of 
Gates's claim,88 it is critical (at least theoretically) to recognize that different 
racial communities may have dramatically different readings of particular texts 
and events, which in turn give rise to questions over textual ownership. 
Suggesting that racial perspectives should limit the expansive ownership 
interests conferred by copyright law is not without difficulties. By positing a 
distinction between white and black subjectivities in the ownership of copyright 
interests, courts would be required to distinguish between such subjectivities. 
Moreover, subjectivities and counterpublics frequently overlap, meaning that 
one person does not simply belong to one discursive sphere and possess a singular 
subject position.89 Any simplistic or binary approach to race, gender, class or 
sexuality would create an inflexible and dogmatic system of conferring copyright 
protection that thus reifies categories of difference (as such simple approaches 
have limited the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment).90 Moreover, there might 
be some situations in which a white-identified writer might produce a work that 
attempts to articulate black subjectivities. Rather than provide a prescriptive 
framework of differences to be acknowledged by copyright law, I propose that 
an already existing legal test of "substantial similarity" for copyright infringement 
cases be extended to recognize that the articulation of a different subjectivity, 
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however constructed and demonstrated, would constitute a distinct work for 
purposes of copyright. Any other legal doctrine would prove unduly burdensome 
and restrict the free flow of ideas and cultural criticism. Moreover, such a position 
would protect writers and authors from piracy, while promoting artistic 
production and public dialogue.91 
Conclusions 
In May 2002, Alice Randall, Houghton Mifflin, and the Mitchell estate 
arrived at an out-of-court settlement. According to press releases, Houghton 
Mifflin will make "unspecified contributions to Morehouse College, a historically 
black school in Atlanta. In return, the lawyers for Mitchell's estate agreed to 
stop trying to block sales of Randall's book." Ironically, Randall will retain the 
derivative rights to her book (meaning that she will control adaptations of The 
Wind Done Gone). 
This controversy illustrated the troubling relationship between the imaginary 
domain, copyright law, and American studies. How should legal discourse 
distribute the ownership of acts, texts, and objects that provide a foundation for 
imaginative activities in a heterogeneous American society? These "rights" are 
extremely valuable and important because they possess the power to control the 
very acts of meaning making, community building, and value maintenance that 
all social groups desire and need to ensure their sovereignty and freedom. If 
distributed primarily to one copyright owner, such "rights" could limit criticism 
of the original by not allowing writers to respond in a similar format as the 
original.92 In other words, a series of academic articles criticizing a popular 
novel/movie does not have the same power as a novel or film making the same 
critique. In its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
insisted that copyright did not immunize a work from comment and criticism.93 
From this premise, the court argued that The Wind Done Gone "is principally 
and purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the 
perspective, judgments, and mythology of Gone With The Wind"94 Moreover, 
the court acknowledged that by re-framing Gone With the Wind from the 
perspective of a southern slave culture to one produced from an African American 
viewpoint Randall transformed the story into something new that, if not 
completely dissimilar, constituted a fair use as a parody. The court, I believe, 
reached the proper result, but failed to articulate an adequate theoretical basis 
for its decision. 
In this article, I have argued that, because of its understanding of the role of 
readers and consumption in shaping the meaning and value of texts, American 
studies must produce scholarship that is relevant to legal discourse and can 
translate its insights into the language of this discourse. I have tried to augment 
the ideas/expression dichotomy in order to specify the notion of expression (in 
the idea/expression dichotomy) by connecting it more tightly to a particular 
community and/or subjectivity. Moreover, although I am committed to 
26 Richard Schur 
developing a race and gender conscious jurisprudence consonant with critical 
race theory, I have not sought to delineate the exact number or types of 
subjectivities that can or should be protected. Instead, I have argued for a fact-
intensive inquiry that examines the overlapping boundaries of experiences and 
subject positions. Finally, I contend that once the issue of alternative subjectivity, 
experience, or imaginary domain is raised, copyright owners who claim an 
infringement should have the burden of proof that their work identifies and 
develops that alternative subjectivity. By arranging the burden of proof in this 
way, copyright law would err on the side of the public domain, which the 
Constitution seems to suggest, instead of property rights. 
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